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While, prima facie, virtue/credit approaches in epistemology would appear
to be in tension with distributed/extended approaches in cognitive science,
Pritchard (2010) has recently argued that the tension here is only apparent,
at least given a weak version of distributed cognition, which claims merely
that external resources often make critical contributions to the formation
of true belief, and a weak virtue theory, which claims merely that, when-
ever a subject achieves knowledge, his cognitive agency makes a significant
contribution to the formation of a true belief. But the significance of the
role played by the subject’s cognitive agency in distributed cognitive systems
is in fact highly variable: at one extreme, formation of a true belief seems
clearly to be significantly creditable to the subject’s agency; at the other
extreme, however, the subject’s agency plays such a peripheral role that it
is at best unclear whether it should receive significant credit for formation
of a true belief. The compatibility of distributed cognition and virtue epis-
temology thus turns on what it takes for a contribution to the formation
of true belief to count as significant. This article argues that the inevitable
vagueness of this notion suggests retreating from virtue epistemology to
a form of process reliabilism and explores the prospects for a distributed
reliabilist epistemology designed to fit smoothly with distributed cognition.
In effect, distributed reliabilism radicalizes Goldberg’s recent extended reli-
abilist view (Goldberg 2010) by allowing the process the reliability of which
determines the epistemic status of a subject’s belief to extend to include not
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only processing performed by other subjects but also processing performed
by non-human technological resources.
“JFGI” is an acronym, occasionally used in online discussions, for “just
fucking google it”. The phrase is mostly used in response to questions the
answers to which are easily obtainable via a simple web search (indeed,
the questioner may simply be directed to http://justfuckinggoogleit.com/),
the suggestion apparently being that, since it is just as good, from the ques-
tioner’s point of view, to retrieve easily googleable information from a website
as it is to receive it from other users, he ought to do so, thus sparing other
users the expenditure of unnecessary effort. The phrase thus hints at a view
on which reliance on other subjects and reliance on non-human resources
are on a par, epistemically speaking, and it is towards such a view that I
want to move in this article.1
I ultimately suggest a version of process reliabilism meant as an explicit
statement of the view. Traditionally, reliabilists have viewed both the provi-
sion of testimony by human interlocutors and the provision of information
by non-human technological resources as being mere background conditions
on belief-formation, capable of influencing the reliability of a subject’s belief-
forming processes but not of constituting parts of those processes. Goldberg
(2010) has recently moved away from the traditional view, arguing that testi-
mony, in particular, may count as part of the cognitive process responsible for
the production of a belief—that, in the case of testimonial belief-formation,
the epistemically relevant process (the process the reliability of which deter-
mines the epistemic status of the target belief) extends beyond the believing
subject to include processing performed by the communicator who provides
the relevant testimony. However, he explicitly rejects the possibility of mak-
ing an analogous move with respect to the contribution made by non-human
resources, denying that, in cases in which the subject depends on information
provided by non-human resources in a manner apparently analogous to that
in which he depends on information provided by other humans in testimony
cases, the epistemically relevant process extends beyond the believing subject
to include processing performed by the relevant external resources (Goldberg
2012). Drawing on the distributed/extended cognition approach in cognitive
science, my goal here is to motivate this more extreme departure from the
traditional reliabilist view.
1. Distributed Cognition and Virtue Epistemology
The route that I take to this goal will be somewhat indirect. In re-
cent years, many epistemologists have abandoned process reliabilism for one
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or another form of virtue reliabilism. (While the forms of virtue reliabil-
ism in question include production by a reliable process as a condition on
knowledge, they go beyond simple process reliabilism by requiring that the
reliability be attributable to the agent in some sense.) The arguments in
favour of making this move are reasonably persuasive, and I therefore begin
with virtue epistemology, looking at the current debate over the compati-
bility of distributed cognition and virtue epistemology. While, prima facie,
virtue/credit approaches in epistemology would appear to be in tension with
distributed/extended approaches in cognitive science, Pritchard (2010) has
recently argued that the tension here is only apparent, at least given a weak
version of distributed cognition, which claims merely that external resources
often make critical contributions to the formation of true belief, and a weak
virtue theory, which claims merely that, whenever a subject achieves knowl-
edge, his cognitive agency makes a significant contribution to the formation
of a true belief. But the significance of the role played by the subject’s cogni-
tive agency in distributed cognitive systems is in fact highly variable: at one
extreme, formation of a true belief seems clearly to be significantly creditable
to the subject’s agency; at the other extreme, however, the subject’s agency
plays such a peripheral role that it is at best unclear whether it should re-
ceive significant credit for formation of a true belief. The compatibility of
distributed cognition and virtue epistemology thus turns on what it takes for
a contribution to the formation of true belief to count as significant. This
article argues that the inevitable vagueness of this notion suggests retreating
from virtue epistemology to a form of process reliabilism and explores the
prospects for a distributed reliabilist epistemology designed to fit smoothly
with distributed cognition. In effect, distributed reliabilism radicalizes Gold-
berg’s recent extended reliabilist view (2010) by allowing the process the
reliability of which determines the epistemic status of a subject’s belief to
extend to include not only processing performed by other subjects but also
processing performed by non-human technological resources.
1.1. Context
Before proceeding, three brief clarificatory remarks: First, distributed
cognition is often used to refer to the tradition of theoretical and empirical
work in cognitive science, associated with Hutchins (Hutchins 1995, 1996;
Hollan et al. 2000), which focusses on cognitive processing in sociotechni-
cal systems including multiple human and technological components, while
extended cognition is often reserved for the current in philosophy of mind,
associated with Clark (Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 1997 2008), which
tends to focus primarily on cognition in systems centred on a single human
augmented by external technological resources. While there are certainly dif-
ferences of emphasis between Hutchins and Clark (Blomberg 2009), these do
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appear for the most part to be merely differences of emphasis, at least if we
set aside strong metaphysical claims sometimes made by extended cognition
theorists about external resources literally constituting parts of agents’ minds
(Michaelian and Sutton 2013), and I will therefore refer interchangeably to
distributed and extended cognition (defaulting to “distributed”).
Second, as my focus here is on the epistemic status of the beliefs of
individual subjects, I focus primarily on systems centred on single subjects.
It should be possible to extend my argument to beliefs formed by subjects
embedded in large-scale distributed socio-technical systems, but I will not
argue that knowledge can be attributed to such systems themselves.
Finally, the forms that cognitive extension can take are of course many
and varied—Sutton cites, for example, external cultural tools, artifacts, and
symbol systems; natural environmental resources; interpersonal and social
distribution or scaffolding; embodied capacities and skills; and even inter-
nalized cognitive artifacts, e.g., mnemonics (Sutton 2006). With most of the
literature on the compatibility of distributed cognition and virtue episte-
mology so far, I focus, relatively narrowly, on interactions between human
subjects and either external technological resources or other human subjects.
As far as the epistemology is concerned, there may be important differences
between this group of cases and some of the remaining cases; in particular, I
concede that, in cases where the relevant external resource is not engaged in
information processing (roughly, in cases where it is not representational, in
Heersmink’s sense (Heersmink 2013))—for example, in cases involving natu-
ral environmental resources—there may not be the same pressure to extend
the belief-forming process beyond the subject.
1.1.1. Weak d-cog
Setting aside differences between the traditions in philosophy and cog-
nitive science, distributed/extended cognition can refer to a whole family of
mutually incompatible views, ranging from strong views (such as those of
Hutchins and Clark), on which the idea of a distributed or extended cog-
nitive system is taken literally, to much weaker views (embedded cognition
(Rupert 2009, 2013), scaffolded cognition (Sterelny 2010), situated cognition
(Robbins and Aydede 2008; Roth and Jornet 2013), and so on), on which
external resources make critical contributions to human cognition without
thereby literally coming to count as parts of distributed/extended systems
(see Smart 2010 for an overview). Most of the literature on the compatibility
of distributed cognition and virtue epistemology so far focusses on a very
weak view, which makes only the (by now) basically uncontroversial claim
that “human cognition is strongly dependent on external resources (whether
or not we call them cognitive)”, as Vaesen puts it (Vaesen 2011, 521). Call
this weak d-cog.
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Since weak d-cog is an extremely moderate view, showing that virtue
epistemology is incompatible with it would, from the point of view of op-
ponents of the virtue approach, be a more impressive result than demon-
strating incompatibility with a stronger view. By the same token, of course,
showing that the virtue approach is compatible with a stronger distributed
view would, from the point of view of proponents of the virtue approach,
be a more impressive result than demonstrating compatibility with the
weak view. However, the key point is that all parties to the debate will
(or should) accept weak d-cog, disagreeing over how much, if at all, to
strengthen it—weak d-cog is so weak that virtually all opponents of more
robust distributed approaches should accept it. The stakes of the debate
are thus extremely high. If the virtue approach turns out to be incom-
patible with weak d-cog, it is incompatible with a claim that essentially
all researchers in both epistemology and cognitive science would accept.
Incompatibility with weak d-cog would thus count as very strong evi-
dence against virtue epistemology, providing good reason to abandon virtue
epistemology.2
1.1.2. COGAWEAK
According to virtue/credit epistemology in general, knowledge can be
(partly) analyzed in terms of the degree to which the formation of the rele-
vant true belief by the subject is due to his reliable cognitive character, i.e.,
the extent to which formation of a true belief is attributable to his cognitive
ability or agency (agency and character are treated more or less interchange-
ably in this framework). Like distributed/extended cognition, virtue/credit
epistemology refers to a broad family of views. On strong views (e.g., Sosa
2007; Zagzebski 1996; Greco 2007), knowledge can be wholly analyzed in
terms of cognitive ability (that is, knowledge just is the product of cognitive
ability). On weak views (e.g., Pritchard 2008 2012), in contrast, cognitive
ability provides a necessary but not a sufficient condition on knowledge.
Most of the literature on the compatibility of d-cog and virtue/credit
epistemology so far focusses on relatively weak views. Pritchard (2010), in
particular, discusses the following view.
COGAWEAK If S knows that P, then S’s true belief that P is the result of
a reliable belief-forming process which is appropriately integrated within S’s
cognitive character such that his cognitive success is to a significant degree
creditable to his cognitive agency.
COGAWEAK contrasts with COGASTRONG, which differs from it in two re-
spects: first, the conditional is replaced with a biconditional; second, the
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subject’s cognitive success (formation of a true belief) is said to be primarily,
rather than significantly, creditable to the subject’s cognitive agency.
Why prefer COGAWEAK to COGASTRONG? Pritchard offers two main
reasons. First, COGASTRONG cannot handle certain types of epistemic luck.
In the well-known “barn country” case (Goldman 1976), for example, the
subject’s cognitive success does seem to be attributable primarily to his cog-
nitive agency, but nevertheless he lacks knowledge, due to the influence of
epistemic luck (the luck here is said to be environmental, rather than in-
tervening, as it is, e.g., in Chisholm’s “sheep in the field” case (Chisholm
1977)). This suggests that an explicit anti-luck condition is required, i.e., that
attributability of cognitive success to the subject’s agency can be at most a
necessary condition on knowledge. Second, even if we therefore break the
biconditional, the view still needs to be weakened further, for there seem to
be cases in which the subject knows without his cognitive success being pri-
marily attributable to his cognitive agency. Pritchard offers a case (originally
due to Lackey 2007) in which a subject needs directions in an unfamiliar city,
asks the first person that he meets, and accepts the directions more or less
uncritically. The idea is that the subject knows, but that his formation of a
true belief, while due to a significant extent to his cognitive agency (because
he chooses to ask someone who looks like he lives in the city, rather than
another tourist, etc.), is not due primarily to his cognitive agency.3
1.2. The current state of play
Setting aside stronger versions of virtue epistemology, is weak d-cog com-
patible with a relatively weak view along the lines of COGAWEAK? Pritchard
argues that it is, claiming that, even in simple cases such as Clark and
Chalmers’ well-known Otto case (Clark and Chalmers 1998), the subject’s
cognitive agency makes a significant contribution to the formation of a true
belief. According to Pritchard, Otto’s acquisition of his notebook already
“represents a great deal of epistemic virtue on his part”:
A lesser cognitive agent ... would have acquiesced in the loss of his (non-extended)
memory and so accepted the epistemic consequences. Moreover, notice that the
way in which Otto employs his notebook also reflects his epistemic virtue. An
agent less concerned with epistemic goods would not, for example, go to the
lengths that Otto goes to in order to ensure that this information resource
is readily available to him but really would just use this notebook as a mere
incidental aid to his cognition. (Pritchard 2010, 233)
In support of this claim, we might note, further, that Clark and Chalmers’
description of Otto as automatically endorsing information retrieved from
his notebook is somewhat misleading—in a more realistic version of the
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case, Otto, as a cognitively virtuous subject, does not automatically endorse
information retrieved from the notebook but rather is sensitive to signs that
retrieved information has become outdated, that the notebook has been
tampered with, etc., just as normal subjects monitor their own biological
memories for cues to inaccuracy (Michaelian 2012a).
The key claim of the strategy, then, is that, due to Otto’s active role in
setting up and using his notebook, the notebook counts as being integrated
into his cognitive character in a way that allows his cognitive success, when he
forms a true belief by relying on the notebook, to be significantly creditable
to his cognitive agency. If this is right, then, when Otto forms a true belief
by relying on the notebook, the belief may, given COGAWEAK, amount to
knowledge.4 In general, as long as, in every case of knowledgeable belief
in which the subject relies, in the manner described by weak d-cog, on an
external resource in forming the relevant true belief (including, for example,
Lackey’s tourist case), the subject’s own cognitive agency plays a significant
role in achieving the formation of a true belief, COGAWEAK will turn out to
be compatible with weak d-cog.
The question at this stage of the game, then, is: is it the case that,
whenever S comes to know that P by relying on an external resource in the
manner described by weak d-cog, S’s cognitive agency nevertheless plays a
significant role in the formation of S’s belief that P?
2. The Role of Agency
In order to work out an answer to this question, I suggest that we need
to look at a broader range of cases than have been discussed in the literature
so far, and to do so more systematically.
2.1. Agency in distributed systems
Pritchard mentions two ways in which Otto’s agency contributes to his
success: first, Otto is responsible for acquiring and setting up the notebook
in the first place; second, Otto is responsible for maintaining his access to
the notebook, updating the information that it contains, and so on. I noted
a third way in which Otto’s agency might play a role: he is responsible for
deciding whether or not to accept information retrieved from the notebook. (I
emphasize that we should not overintellectualize: the relevant decisions may
be—and in real cases normally are—made automatically and unconsciously.)
These can be viewed as particular instances of three general ways in which a
subject’s agency can contribute to his cognitive success when he forms a true
belief by relying on external resources in the manner described by weak d-
cog: cognitive agency can contribute to the selection of the relevant external
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resources, the assembly of the distributed system, and the endorsement of
information produced by the system.
2.1.1. Selection and endorsement
In a previous paper (Michaelian 2012b), I argued that agents who rely
on imperfect information sources (i.e., all real agents) face what I referred
to as the endorsement problem, the problem of forming beliefs in a reliable
manner despite relying on imperfectly reliable information sources. My claim
was that a capacity for metacognitive monitoring and control plays a crucial
role in explaining how agents solve this problem. For example, due in part to
the reconstructive character of episodic memory retrieval (Michaelian 2011),
in which information from various sources is combined and transformed to
produce the representation eventually output by “retrieval”, an agent faces a
real risk of endorsing inaccurate representations of his past experiences and
hence of forming false memory beliefs. I argued that, in the case of episodic
memory retrieval, agents solve the endorsement problem through the form
of metacognitive monitoring described by the source monitoring framework
(Johnson et al. 1993; Mitchell and Johnson 2009), essentially by relying on
key content-based characteristics of retrieved information to infer source. I
also briefly discussed what I referred to as the selection problem, the problem
of selecting one’s resources so that they provide one with answers to whatever
questions are currently driving inquiry, taking into account the availability
of resources, their reliability, the costs involved in their use, and so on. For
example, in cases where an agent has previously determined the answer to a
question, he might choose between retrieving the answer from memory and
working it out anew (see section 2.2.1 below).
These initial formulations applied only to with internal versions of the
endorsement and selection problems. As Arango-Muñoz has recently pointed
out, however, selection and endorsement look somewhat more complicated
when we take into account the role of external resources highlighted by weak
d-cog. First, the selection problem now becomes what he refers to as the
extended selection problem: “[s]ince normal subjects routinely use external
as well as internal resources, each time they are confronted with a cognitive
problem, they have to choose whether to solve it internally or externally”
(Arango-Muñoz 2013, 139). With our increasing reliance on various online
resources, the extended selection problem becomes increasingly prominent;
when I need to retrieve information, do I rely on my own internal memory
or do I JFGI? For example, Sparrow et al. (2011) (drawing in part on the
transactive memory framework (Ren and Argote 2011; Theiner 2013)) have
recently found that, when subjects expect to have access to information in
the future, memory for that information decreases, while memory for where
to find the information increases, an apparently efficient strategy for solving
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this particular instance of the selection problem. While Arango-Muñoz’s
formulation of the extended selection problem is a step in the right direction,
it should be emphasized that, in practice, solving the extended selection
problem is often not a matter of choosing between mutually exclusive internal
and external resources; especially in more complex tasks, the subject often
selects a combination of internal and external resources. For example, one
may rely on internal memory for some aspects of the needed information
while relying on multiple external resources for additional aspects of the
information.
Second, taking into account the role of external resources in cogni-
tion, the endorsement problem now has two distinct aspects. Endorsement of
internally retrieved information: when the subject internally generates a rep-
resentation, he must decide whether or not to endorse it. This corresponds
to the formulation of the endorsement problem given in Michaelian 2012b.
Endorsement of externally retrieved information: when the subject acquires
information from an external resource, he must decide whether or not to
endorse it. For example, after retrieving information from a website, the sub-
ject needs to decide whether to go ahead and endorse it (Chiu et al. 2013).
Again, in practice, endorsement will often be more complicated than this
formulation suggests. The representation produced by an extended process
may incorporate information produced by a combination of internal and ex-
ternal resources, and the subject’s decision whether or not to endorse it will
presumably be sensitive to his individual levels of confidence in the various
resources involved, as well as to his confidence in the particular combination
of resources used, relative to the task at hand.
2.1.2. Assembly
The extended selection problem and the external version of the endorse-
ment problem correspond to two of the ways in which Otto’s agency makes
a credit-worthy contribution to his formation of a true belief: he is responsi-
ble for selecting it (rather than continuing to rely on his declining biological
memory), and he is responsible for choosing to endorse information retrieved
from the notebook on particular occasions. The final way in which Otto’s
agency makes a contribution brings out that subjects who rely on external
resources in the manner described by weak d-cog face a third problem, what
we might refer to as the assembly problem: having selected an appropriate
resource (or complex of resources), the agent must construct the distributed
system, coordinate its activity, and monitor its functioning.5
Kirchhoff and Newsome usefully distinguish between two aspects of as-
sembly. Construction refers to “the actual putting together of parts to form
a distributed cognitive system” (2012, 166). The external components of dis-
tributed systems are not always ready-made or readily available. The agent
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may need to act to ensure that he has access to the relevant resource; in
many cases, he may need to modify an existing resource so that it suits his
informational needs or even to create it more or less from scratch. Coordina-
tion refers to “the coordination and continuous maintenance of the system’s
parts” (Kirchhoff and Newsome 2012, 166). The agent may need to com-
bine information from various resources, ensure that resources deliver their
information in the right order, and so on. Additionally, the agent may need
to monitor the assembled system (and its individual components) to ensure
that they are functioning as desired. A given component may, for example,
fail, or work too slowly, or turn out to be unable to provide the information
it was expected to provide.
2.2. The variable contribution of agency
Considering a range of cases of interaction both with other human agents
and with technological resources, it will emerge that distributed cognition is
a mixed bag, as far as the contribution of agency is concerned. In some
cases, it seems clear that agency makes the sort of significant contribution
required by COGAWEAK, whether in selection, assembly, or endorsement.
In other cases, however—in particular, in cases involving straightforward
reliance on testimony provided by unknown informants or analogous reliance
on instruments—it is at best unclear whether the subject’s agency makes
a significant contribution at any stage of the belief-forming process. The
compatibility of virtue epistemology and weak d-cog will thus turn out to
depend on what it takes for a contribution to the achievement of cognitive
success to count as significant.
2.2.1. Agency in selection
In a relatively simple instance of the extended selection problem, the
agent must choose between relying on an internal resource and relying on
an external resource to accomplish a given cognitive task. In a realistic
version of Clark and Chalmers’ case, Otto, for example, retains some use
of his biological memory, and so faces a choice between relying on his
biological memory to retrieve the answer to a given question and relying on
his notebook.6 Even in such a relatively simple case, the agent must assess
trade-offs among speed, accuracy, and the various costs involved in using
internal and external memory: as Arango-Muñoz points out (drawing on
Kalnikaité and Whittaker’s investigation of factors determining the choice
between internal and external memory (2007)), “[a]n internal strategy is
normally quicker but has cognitive costs, since it requires working memory
and attention; moreover, it is less accurate: An external strategy, on the other
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hand, is more accurate, but has sensory-motor costs and is normally less
efficient; i.e. it takes longer” (Arango-Muñoz, 2013 139). Moreover, there
is evidence that subjects successfully negotiate such trade-offs. For example,
when required to choose between retrieving the answer to an arithmetic
problem from memory (the internal resource) and calculating it using pen
and scrap paper (the external resource), subjects apparently rely on their
feeling of knowing (FOK) to predict whether they can retrieve the answer
or need to rely on the external resource to calculate it; and the FOK reliably
predicts ability to retrieve the answer from memory (Reder and Ritter 1992;
Paynter et al. 2009).
In a more complex instance of the selection problem, the subject chooses
not simply between relying on an internal resource and relying on an external
resource but rather among different assemblages of multiple internal and
external resources. In such cases, the trade-offs that must be negotiated are
more numerous and varied, and the contribution of the subject’s agency will
be correspondingly greater.7 For example, when driving an unfamiliar route,
I may rely on my own sense of direction (grounded in an appreciation of
various environmental cues), information provided by a GPS unit, hard-copy
maps, information provided by my passengers (who themselves may have
access to various external resources), and information provided by strangers
I/we ask for directions (e.g., see Forlizzi et al. 2010 on navigation as a
collaborative process).
At the other extreme, however, are cases in which little effort or intel-
ligence goes into selecting the relevant external resources, and in which the
role played by the subject’s agency appears to be correspondingly minimal.
Consider again Lackey’s tourist case, as redeployed by Pritchard. Pritchard
suggests that it is clear that the tourist who, upon arriving in an unfamiliar
city, simply asks the first person she sees for directions and forms her belief
on the basis of the information he provides has knowledge, as long as we
assume, inter alia, that she “is suitably responsive to epistemically relevant
factors—it is not as if, for example, she would ask someone who would clearly
not be a good informant, and it is not as if she would believe whatever she
was told, even if it was obviously false” (2010, 141); the same assumption
suggests that her cognitive agency makes a contribution to her formation of
a true belief that will count as significant in the sense of COGAWEAK. This
sort of optimism about the capacity of subjects to select reliable informants
and filter out unreliable information is shared by Sperber and colleagues
(Sperber et al. 2010), who argue, on the basis of evidence including work on
children’s preference for trustworthy informants (Mascaro and Sperber 2009;
Clément 2010), that we are reasonably good at selecting reliable informants
(I return to the claim about our sensitivity to unreliable information, also
endorsed by Sperber et al., in section 2.2.2). As I have argued elsewhere,
however, this optimism may be unfounded: that we have a preference for re-
liable informants does not mean that we are in fact good at selecting reliable
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informants (Michaelian 2013b; but see Sperber 2013 for a response). More-
over, it seems that the tourist may gain knowledge from her informant’s
testimony even if she is not good at selecting reliable informants, at least
assuming that she is in a sufficiently epistemically friendly environment, con-
taining relatively few unreliable informants (Michaelian 2013a). (I want to
know what time it is, but I don’t have a watch. I ask the first person I pass
on the street for the time. He tells me, and I believe him. If he were, for some
reason, incompetent or dishonest with respect to the time, I would still have
asked him for the time. But this need not prevent me from coming to know,
on the basis of the information he provides, what time it is. Cf. Gerken 2013
on the contribution of the environment to testimonial justification.) If so,
this provides us with a type of case in which, as far as selection is concerned,
the subject appears to attain knowledge without his cognitive agency making
a significant contribution.
2.2.2. Agency in endorsement
In a relatively simple instance of the endorsement problem, the subject
must determine whether to endorse information retrieved either from his own
biological memory (the internal version of the problem) or from an external
memory store (the external version of the problem). It seems clear that the
subject’s agency makes a significant contribution to solving the internal ver-
sion of the problem; if so, then, in parallel external cases, it should be clear
that the subject’s agency makes a significant contribution to solving the ex-
ternal version of the problem. Elsewhere (Michaelian 2012b), I have argued
that, as far as memory is concerned, subjects solve the endorsement problem
by relying on the form of metacognitive monitoring described by Johnson
et al.’s source monitoring framework (SMF) (Johnson et al. 1993; Mitchell
and Johnson 2009) (metacognitive monitoring may play a similar role in
other sources of knowledge, including perception (Loussouarn et al. 2011)
and reasoning (Cox and Raja 2011)). According to the SMF, records are
typically not tagged with source information; instead, subjects infer source
using heuristics relying on average content-based differences (e.g., level of
sensory, contextual, semantic, and affective detail) among records originat-
ing in different sources. While source monitoring is normally unconscious
and automatic (roughly, a type 1 process (Evans and Stanovich 2013)), it
clearly counts as appropriately integrated into the subject’s cognitive char-
acter, thus allowing us to assign a significant degree of credit for formation
of a true belief to the subject’s cognitive character in cases involving the
internal version of the endorsement problem. Arango-Muñoz (2013) has re-
cently argued for an alternative view on the role of metacognition in solving
the internal version of the endorsement problem, assigning the main role to
metacognitive or epistemic feelings (de Sousa 2008; Arango-Muñoz 2014;
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Dokic 2014; Proust 2013) based on subpersonal monitoring of cognitive
processing, rather than to heuristic monitoring of the sort described by the
SMF, in which epistemic feelings do not figure explicitly; positive feelings
(e.g., of confidence or rightness) or negative feelings (e.g., of uncertainty
or error) guide the subject’s decision to accept or reject retrieved internally
retrieved information. This account may ultimately be compatible with the
source monitoring account, since, while epistemic feelings are available to
consciousness, they are themselves produced by unconscious heuristic moni-
toring (Koriat 2000; Arango-Muñoz and Michaelian 2014). Whether or not
the accounts are compatible, their implications are similar as far as cognitive
agency are concerned. Moreover, either metacognitive feelings or the sort
of non-affective monitoring described by the SMF may play an analogous
role in enabling subjects to solve the external version of the endorsement
problem. For example, the subject may rely on a feeling of truth (deter-
mined by cognitive fluency, i.e., subjective ease of processing (Oppenheimer
2008)) to shape his decision whether to endorse or reject externally retrieved
information (Reber and Unkelbach 2010). Whatever the mechanism respon-
sible for determining endorsement/rejection, there will clearly be a class of
cases of external endorsement in which the subject’s cognitive agency receives
significant credit for formation of a true belief.
In more complex instances of the endorsement problem, in which the
subject must determine whether to endorse (and with what level of confi-
dence) a representation produced by combining information retrieved from
multiple internal and external resources, the significance of the contribution
of the subject’s agency is equally unproblematic. Consider the case of conver-
sational remembering (Sutton et al. 2010), in which groups of two or more
individuals remember together. As Hirst and Echterhoff point out (2012),
such distributed remembering has both benefits (e.g., collaborative facilita-
tion, in which the group as a whole recalls more than individuals recall alone
(Weldon 2001) and costs (e.g., collaborative inhibition, in which an individ-
ual remembering in a group recalls less than he would recall alone (Rajaram
and Pereira-Pasarin 2010)). Though they do not necessarily view this as a
cost (Fagin et al. 2013), collaborative remembering can also lead to social
contagion of memory (Roediger et al. 2001), in which memories spread from
one person to another by means of conversational interaction, in some cases
resulting in memory that does not correspond to experience. The example
of social contagion brings to the fore the need for subjects embedded in
distributed memory systems to actively monitor the sources of retrieved in-
formation, in order to ensure the accuracy of their own subsequent memories,
and hence emphasizes the significant contribution of cognitive agency.
However, returning to the case of testimony, in which a subject relatively
passively receives information from another agent, as opposed to actively
participating in the construction of a shared memory, it appears that the
subject’s agency may play an insignificant role in achieving formation of a
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true belief. As noted above, Pritchard (2010), like Sperber et al. (2010) (and
cf. Fricker, 1995), is optimistic about the ability of recipients of communi-
cated information to filter out unreliable information; this optimism appears
to be unwarranted. Even setting aside Gilbert’s influential view, on which
acceptance of communicated information is automatic (with possible rejec-
tion being a subsequent, effortful step) (Gilbert et al. 1990, 1993), there is
abundant evidence (Michaelian 2010, 2012c) that we are simply not good
at detecting dishonesty on the part of communicators; the typical finding,
in fact, is that we are barely better than chance (Vrij 2008). The upshot is
that, while there will be cases in which the subject’s agency plays a role, in
many cases, when the subject forms a true testimonial belief, the truth of the
belief is due entirely to the truth of the received testimony—had the received
information been false (because dishonest), he would have accepted it any-
way; and it seems mistaken, in such cases, to assign a significant role to the
subject’s agency in explaining formation of a true belief, as far as endorse-
ment is concerned. Of course, more active monitoring may be triggered if the
speaker displays obvious signs of apparent dishonesty or incompetence, but
in straightforward cases monitoring by the recipient does not play a signifi-
cant role. We thus have an important class of cases—note that the class will
include not only cases of reliance on testifiers but also cases of analogous
reliance on non-human instruments—in which the subject’s agency plays a
significant role in explaining his success in forming a true belief neither in
the selection phase nor in the endorsement phase of the belief-forming pro-
cess. There remains the possibility that agency plays a significant role in the
assembly phase, to which I turn next.
2.2.3. Agency in assembly
In some instances of the assembly problem, the subject’s agency plays a
role that intuitively counts as significant. Consider again Otto and his note-
book. As Pritchard emphasizes, Otto plays an active role in constructing and
maintaining the extended system. This is typical of the use of notebooks
as external memory aids, including by patients with normal internal memo-
ries. The subject must organize the contents of the notebook if they are to
be useful (constructing the distributed system). And the contents are then
often used as prompts to aid the subject to retrieve information from in-
ternal memory (which requires the subject to coordinate the system), rather
than simply acting as an external substitute for the internal memory store
(see Yeo’s historical study (2008)) and Kalnikaité and Whittaker (2008) for
a contemporary approach). More generally, as notebooks and more novel
forms of external memory (smartphones, etc.) are typically used to augment
rather than simply replace biological memory (Clowes 2008, 2013), assembly
of the relevant distributed systems normally involves an active contribution
by the agent.
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In more complex instances, the significance of the contribution of the
subject’s agency is all the more evident. Dählback, Kristiansson, and Stjern-
berg (2013), for example, explore mnemonic strategies used by elderly adults
coping with cognitive decline. They emphasize that such strategies often
make use of both artifacts (lists, material reminders) and other agents, and
often involve backups and failsafes in order to produce resilient distributed
memory systems. In many cases, such distributed systems are constructed
largely (though usually not only) by the subject, and depend on the subject’s
active monitoring to maintain coordination.
But returning again to cases at the other end of the spectrum, such
as Lackey’s tourist case and analogous cases of straightforward reliance on
available instruments, the significance of the contribution of the subject’s
agency to the assembly phase is at best unclear. Indeed, in many of the
relevant cases, “assembly” is essentially a trivial process—the tourist simply
asks the first person she sees for directions. Thus, as far as the role of
agency in distributed cognitive systems is concerned, we are faced with a
range of cases. At one extreme, we have a class of cases in which the subject
plays an active role in selecting the assemblage of internal and external
resources to be used, constructing and coordinating the overall distributed
system, and actively monitoring the functioning of the system in order to
determine whether to endorse the information output by the system; here,
the contribution of the subject’s agency presumably meets the standard of
significance set by COGAWEAK. At the other extreme, however, we have a
class of cases in which the subject’s agency appears to make only a negligeable
contribution to selection, assembly, and endorsement. In principle, minimal
contributions of the subject’s agency at each of the selection, assembly, and
endorsement phases might add up to a significant overall contribution, but
it seems likely that this does not occur in the sort of cases of straightforward
reliance on external resources that I have described: when I ask someone for
directions, form a belief about the current time by looking at a clock, or
JFGI, it is unclear whether the minimal role played by my own agency is
sufficient to count as significant, in the relevant sense.
3. Retreating from Virtue Epistemology
In this final section, I suggest that this point about the variable contri-
bution of agency gives us good reason to retreat from virtue epistemology to
a form of process reliabilism designed to accommodate d-cog.
3.1. Attempts to save virtue epistemology
Before doing so, however, I want to consider two important strategies
designd to save virtue epistemology.
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3.1.1. The contextualist strategy
Kelp (2013) argues that Pritchard’s and Vaesen’s arguments against the
compatibility of robust virtue epistemology (e.g., COGASTRONG) and weak
d-cog turn on the fact that the notion of primary creditability and related
notions are context sensitive: depending on which features of the situation
are salient in the conversational context, Otto*’s true belief (where Otto* is
like Otto, except that his wife plays a crucial role in setting up his notebook
for him), for example, may or may not seem to be primarily creditable to
his cognitive agency. Kelp further argues that standard responses to wor-
ries about the context-sensitivity of attributions of primary creditability can
thus be invoked to defeat arguments for the incompatibility of robust virtue
epistemology and weak d-cog. One obvious possibility here is to adopt a
form of contextualism about knowledge (Greco 2007).8 A defender of virtue
epistemology might attempt to respond to the worry, developed here, about
the compatibility of weak d-cog and even COGAWEAK by adopting Kelp’s
strategy: just as attributions of primary creditability are context sensitive,
attributions of significant creditability are context sensitive; hence, whether
the creditability of the subject’s agency in the relevant class of cases counts
as significant will depend on which aspects of those cases are conversa-
tionally salient; if we adopt a form of contextualism, this need not be a
problem.
Contextualists may be content with this strategy; the rest of us should
not be. I have nothing novel to say against contextualism here, but I point
out that those of us who are committed to a vision of epistemology as in-
vestigating natural phenomena (e.g., Kornblith 2002), with objective bound-
aries in the world, independent of what may or may not be salient in a
given context, will reject the contextualist strategy for saving (weak) virtue
epistemology.
3.1.2. The distributed credit strategy
Assuming that we reject the contextualist strategy, one possibility that
suggests itself, in light of the lack of an objective standard for determining
whether the contribution of a subject’s agency to his cognitive success counts
as significant and therefore creditworthy, is to refrain from attempting to
partition credit, instead assigning credit to the distributed system as a whole.
A view in this vicinity is suggested by Green (2012, 2014):
CREDIT FOR US If S knows that P, then the abilities that contribute to the
formation and sustenance of S’s belief that P deserve a high degree of credit for
S knowing P whether those abilities are contributed solely by S or also by other
agents.
330 Kourken Michaelian
It might appear that Green’s view avoids the problem of vagueness that
befalls COGAWEAK, since, in order to apply the view, we do not need to be
able to say whether the agency of the subject whose true belief is in question
deserves a high degree of credit for his cognitive success—there is no need to
partition credit among the various subjects who contribute to that success.
But CREDIT FOR US restricts credit to the human (agential) components
of distributed systems (in this respect, it is something like a virtue-theoretic
analogue of Goldberg’s extended reliabilism, discussed in section 3.2 below),
and this feature of the view means that it falls prey to a version of the
problem of vagueness, for it requires us to be able to say whether the human
components of the distributed system (vs. the technological components)
deserve a high degree of credit. The same problem would obviously also
arise for a version of the view which referred to a significant degree of credit.
We might therefore move to a fully distributed credit view, along the
following lines.
CREDIT FOR US AND THE MACHINES If S knows that P, then the abilities
that contribute to the formation and sustenance of S’s belief that P deserve credit
for S knowing P, whether those abilities are contributed solely by S or also by
other human agents and non-human resources.
But can we make sense of assigning credit for cognitive success not only to
the human subjects who contribute to it but also to the non-human resources
(e.g., instruments) on which they rely?
To the extent that it makes sense to assign credit only where there is
agency, it would appear that views like CREDIT FOR US AND THE MA-
CHINES are non-starters. It might, however, be possible to work out a no-
tion of distributed agency. The core idea would be that we view distributed
systems themselves as manifesting agency. Some components of distributed
systems may also themselves manifest agency, while others (viz., the non-
human components) do not. But in the context of knowledge attributions,
we focus on distributed systems as wholes, viewing them as manifesting a
form of agency or ability, which then receives credit for the successful forma-
tion of a true belief. Something like this distributed agency view is suggested
by Kirchhoff (inspired in part by Sutton’s remarks on the possibility of a
“deterritorialized cognitive science” (Sutton 2010, 213)): “Unlike FP [the al-
ternative “fixed properties” view], DP [his “dynamic properties” view] does
not assume, when having to explain the integration/assembly of cognitive
systems, that the individual organism is the most active element. DP im-
plies that assembly of cognitive systems is the result of richly dynamical and
distributed elements, where there is no collapse into individualism like in
FP” (Kirchhoff 2012, 288). The result is a non-individualistic conception
of cognitive agency. For example, Kirchhoff and Newsome, considering re-
search on collaborative recall (Sutton et al. 2010), contend that, in cases of
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collaborative recall, the distributed system composed by the collaborating
subjects is “the appropriate target of epistemic credit” (Kirchhoff and New-
some 2012, 174). A fully distributed notion of agency, on which agency
belongs to distributed systems as wholes (including both human and non-
human components), would allow us to make sense of a view like CREDIT
FOR US AND THE MACHINES and thus to retain a virtue approach
without falling prey to the worry about vagueness that afflicts views like
COGAWEAK and CREDIT FOR US.9
But the reasons offered by Kirchhoff for moving to a fully distributed
conception of cognitive agency are far from decisive. Moreover, there are
good reasons to be cautious about adopting such a conception. As Giere
points out,
The culture in scientifically advanced societies includes a concept of a human
agent. According to this concept, agents are said to have minds as well as bodies.
Agents are conscious of things in their environment and are self-conscious of
themselves as actors in their environment. Agents have beliefs about themselves
and their environments. Agents have memories of things past. Agents are capable
of making plans and sometimes intentionally carrying them out. Agents are also
responsible for their actions according to the standards of the culture and local
communities. And they may justifiably claim to know some things and not other
things. (Giere 2007, 316)
The sorts of non-human technological resources involved in distributed cog-
nitive systems obviously do not satisfy these requirements. We can of course
make sense of treating a system not all of the components of which are
agents as being itself an agent (humans are agents, though their components
are not themselves agents). When it comes to distributed systems, however,
given that, to the extent that we need to refer to agency, we can appeal to
the agency of their human components, parsimony dictates refraining from
assigning agency to distributed systems as wholes (though we may still be
able to motivate a view of agency as being distributed across the human
components of distributed systems, as in CREDIT FOR US). Hence it is
preferable to reject a fully distributed conception of agency, and with it views
like CREDIT FOR US AND THE MACHINES, at which point we are left
only with views like COGAWEAK, which secure compatibility with d-cog at
the cost of unacceptable vagueness.
3.2. Prospects for distributed reliabilism
Given that problems arise for virtue theories when we try to secure their
compatibility with d-cog (though, if Kelp is right, these problems may ulti-
mately be more general), a move that may be worth exploring is retreating
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from virtue epistemology to a view closer to the sort of process reliabil-
ism from which it descends. In the remainder of this section, I explore the
prospects for this move, considering first Goldberg’s view and then an alter-
native, distributed reliabilist view. Retreating from virtue/credit epistemology
to process reliabilism involves certain costs, since we give up the advantages
of virtue/credit theories that prompted the move in the first place; I consider
these costs as well.
3.2.1. Extended belief-forming processes
While we might, of course, attempt to combine d-cog with traditional
Goldman-style process reliabilism, Goldberg has recently argued that belief-
forming processes extend to include processing performed by other agents
(though not processing performed by non-human external resources).
Goldberg’s argument for the view that the process the reliability of which
is relevant to the epistemic assessment of a belief may extend beyond the
subject to include information processing performed by the testifier turns on
the claim that the following “generic epistemic extended mind hypothesis” is
true of testimonial belief (Goldberg 2012):
GEEM For at least some cases in which a subject S believes that P, a proper epis-
temic assessment of S′s belief requires an epistemic assessment of information
processing that takes place in the subject’s environment.
The argument for applying GEEM to testimony is essentially that it is implied
by a (plausible) more general principle:
when a subject S′s belief that P is formed (or sustained) through a process π
that takes as its input the output of a given stretch of cognitive processing π∗,
then we should regard the belief-forming and -sustaining process relating to S’s
belief that P as including both π and π∗. (Goldberg 2012)
Memory provides one special case of this general principle: when assessing
a memory belief, we consider not only the reliability of the process by which
the belief was stored and retrieved but also the reliability of the process by
which it was initially produced.10 Memory is, in effect, a temporally extended
process. Testimony, he argues (I return to his argument in section 3.2.2), then
appears as another special case, with the extension now being interpersonal
rather than temporal.
While it might seem that, if the process responsible for the forma-
tion of beliefs based on information received from human speakers should
be characterized as extended, then so should the process responsible for
the formation of beliefs based on information received from non-human
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resources, Goldberg argues that GEEM cannot be applied in this way. His
argument for this negative claim has two steps. First, he argues that “to rely in
belief-formation on another speaker is to rely on an epistemic subject, that is,
on a system which itself is susceptible to epistemic assessment in its own right,
whereas “mere” instruments are mechanisms are not properly regarded as
epistemic subjects in their own right, they are not susceptible to normative
epistemic assessment” (2012, 182). Second, he argues that this (supposed)
disanalogy between humans and instruments makes a difference to how we
should delineate belief-forming processes. I deal with these two steps in turn.
Step 1: Are non-human components of distributed systems subject to nor-
mative epistemic assessment? Invoking a distinction originally drawn by Gold-
man (1979), Goldberg argues that we should classify the contributions of
(non-human) external resources to cognitive processing as “brute-causal”, as
opposed to “cognitive-psychological”. Now, we do indeed need some way
of distinguishing between those causal antecedents of a belief that are rele-
vant to its epistemic status and those that are not, since counting the entire
causal history as relevant would lead to counterintuitive verdicts (as Gold-
berg points out) or even make epistemic evaluation impossible; Goldberg’s
proposal is that we should say that only processing performed by human
subjects is relevant here, for human subjects, unlike other external resources,
are subject to normative assessment, in the sense that they can display (or fail
to display) epistemic responsibility and rationality, as opposed to mere reli-
ability (Goldberg 2012, 188). For example, he suggests, what goes wrong in
Bonjour’s well-known case of Norman the clairvoyant (Bonjour, 1980) is that
Norman lacks responsibility (despite having a form of reliable clairvoyance).
The sort of response to reliable clairvoyance and similar cases that Gold-
berg invokes here is not the only sort of response available—one might con-
tinue to defend a simple form of reliabilism, which denies that factors such
as responsibility are relevant to the normative status of beliefs. For example,
as Kornblith points out (2012), requiring, as Bonjour does, that the subject
reflect on the epistemic status of his beliefs before he can be said to have
knowledge sets the standards for knowledge extremely high; we may well
want to resist this move—to say that (perhaps counterintuitively) the reliable
clairvoyant’s beliefs are not epistemically defective. But there is a more serious
problem with Goldberg’s claim that instruments are not subject to normative
assessment; simply put, they are indeed subject to such assessment. The dif-
ference between instruments and agents is that normative assessment of the
latter is sensitive to a broader range of factors than is normative assessment
of the former, not that the latter, but not the former, are subject to normative
assessment at all. In the case of instruments, normative assessment tends to
be sensitive primarily to relatively thin properties, such as reliability. In the
case of agents, normative assessment tends to be sensitive to (in addition
to these thin properties) various thicker properties, such as rationality and
responsibility. But that does not make assessment of instruments any less
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normative, just as our assessment of agents does not become less normative
when we take only their reliability into account.
This conclusion is sufficient to undermine Goldberg’s argument against
granting that GEEM applies to beliefs formed by reliance on non-human
external resources. But even if we continue to insist that instruments are not
subject to normative epistemic assessment, step 2 of the argument is equally
problematic.
Step 2: Does extension depend on normative assessability? Goldberg’s ar-
gument for the claim that only in cases where the external information source
is itself subject to normative assessment should belief-forming processes be
said to be extended is straightforward. Many processes carry information,
and thus “we face a choice: we must either grant that Goldman’s distinction
between the brute-causal and the cognitive-psychological is irrelevant to dox-
astic justification after all; or else we must find some criterion to distinguish,
from among all the information processing that is done in the world, which
sorts are such that it is the “goodness” of those sorts that is relevant to epis-
temic assessments of doxastic justification” (2012, 188). For reasons given
above, the former possibility is unacceptable; and Goldberg suggests that his
normative assessability criterion is the best criterion available. However, he
provides little argument for this. Moreover, the criterion faces two problems.
First, it is unacceptable on broad methodological grounds. Employing
normative assessability as the criterion for the extension of belief-forming
process is naturalistically unacceptable. From a naturalistic point of view,
the question whether a given belief-forming process is extended or not—
the question of how to delimit the process—should turn on features of the
process itself, not on whether we are prepared to assess it in normative
terms. (Of course, if we adopt a sufficiently deeply naturalistic account of
epistemic norms, such as that developed by Proust (2013), then this worry
about the naturalistic acceptability of the normative assessability criterion
may go away. Adopting such an account, however, simply reinforces the point
that instruments as well as agents are subject to normative assessment.)
Second, there are plausible, naturalistically-acceptable alternative criteria
available. The need for a criterion arises, recall, because we need to distinguish
between those external information-carrying factors that should be counted
as part of the belief-forming processes and those external information-
carrying factors that should be excluded, counting instead as part of the
mere causal background of belief-formation. One obvious way of drawing
this distinction is to say that external factors that merely carry information
(e.g., a tree that conveys information about its age via the number of its
rings) are part of the mere causal background, whereas external factors that
actually engage in information processing (e.g., an instrument designed to
calculate the age of a tree) can count as part of the belief-forming process.
Another way is provided by Palermos, who argues that the sort of continuous
mutual interaction that is described by dynamical systems theory provides a
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criterion for extension of belief-forming processes (Palermos 2011, 2014). Or
we might want to appeal here to the notion of cognitive integration. It is not
my aim here to provide an argument for selecting one of these criteria; my
point is simply that there are better criteria available. And these alternative
criteria do not have the implication that Goldberg needs them to have in
order to resist extending belief-forming processes into non-human resources,
in addition to other human agents.
3.2.2. Distributed belief-forming processes
If the argument of section 3.2.1 is right, then, given that we should
say that belief-forming processes extend to include processing performed
by speakers in cases of testimony, we should also say that belief-forming
processes extend to include processing performed by non-human resources
where these play a role analogous to that played by speakers—roughly,
transmitting the information that, if endorsed by the subject, constitutes
the content of the resulting belief.11 (In order to have a label to distin-
guish between Goldberg’s “speakers-only” view and the alternative “speak-
ers + instruments” view, I will refer to the former as extended reliabilism
and to the latter as distributed reliabilism.) But what positive reason do
we have for extending the process in the case of testimony, in the first
place?
Goldberg’s positive argument, as noted above, involves an appeal to a
view of memory as a temporally extended process; the idea is that memory is
a reliable belief-dependent process (in approximately Goldman’s sense (1979)).
One might attempt to resist extending the memory process by making the
epistemic status of the memory belief depend only on the subject’s current
beliefs about whether he genuinely remembers or not, but, as Goldberg points
out (2010, 70), this will not work: if the process by which the subject initially
formed the relevant belief was unreliable, the current belief is unjustified,
whatever the subject’s beliefs about what he remembers. Thus, when a subject
forms a belief by retrieving a belief from memory, the process the reliability
of which determines the epistemic status of the belief extends (temporally) to
include the earlier process (for example, perception) by which the belief was
initially produced. Something similar seems to go for testimony: we should
not say that only the subject’s beliefs about the relevant testimony influence
the epistemic status of his testimonial belief; if the testimony is unreliable,
this implies that the resulting testimonial belief is unjustified, whatever the
subject’s beliefs about the testimony in question.
In order to count testimony as a belief-dependent process, Goldberg
obviously needs to liberalize the concept of a belief-dependent process (it is
not as if the communicator’s own beliefs are the inputs to the process). He
proposes the following intuitive liberalization:
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First, a belief-dependent process [on the liberalized understanding] must be
a cognitive process that the reliability of whose outputs are a function of the
reliability of its inputs. This, in turn, requires that the process should have inputs,
and that these inputs be assessable in terms of their reliability. And, in order to
be strict about what it is for an input to be assessable in terms of its reliability,
we will insist that an input satisfies this condition only if it (the input) is itself
the output of a cognitive process (process-type) whose reliability can be assessed
in its turn. (Goldberg 2010, 72)
This liberalized concept of a belief-dependent process (a “quasi-belief depen-
dent” process) allows us to count testimonial belief formation as a belief-
dependent process, since the reliability of testimonial belief formation de-
pends on the reliability of the relevant testimony.
Similarly, the concept allows us—as long as we do not interpret the
requirement that the input be the output of a cognitive process in a question-
begging way—to count belief-formation relying on information received from
non-human resources in a manner analogous to reliance on testimonial infor-
mation as a quasi-belief dependent process, despite the fact that non-human
resources presumably do not themselves have beliefs in any strict sense. Con-
sider a pair of simple cases:
Case 1: Subject S, who has been inside all day, asks agent A, who has just
come in from outside, what the outside temperature is. A says that it
is about 35◦C outside. S endorses the information received from A
and thereby forms a belief that it is about 35◦C outside.
Case 2: S, who has been inside all day, looks through the window at a ther-
mometer T attached to the building. T indicates that it is about 35◦C
outside. S endorses the information received from T and thereby
forms a belief that it is about 35◦C outside.
Of course, one might insist that, in case 2, only the subject’s beliefs about the
reliability of the thermometer influence the epistemic status of his temper-
ature belief, whereas, in case 1, the reliability of the information-processing
performed by A is relevant. But, intuitively, the epistemic status of that belief
varies with the reliability of the thermometer, just as the epistemic status
of the subject’s belief in case 1 varies with the reliability of the testifier.
Thus, absent strong reason not to, we should resist relegating the work-
ings of the thermometer to the mere causal background against which the
belief-forming process unfolds and should instead include the thermome-
ter’s contribution as part of the belief-forming process. I have argued above
that Goldberg’s attempt to give us such a reason is unconvincing. Thus I
conclude (provisionally) that, given that we should move to extended relia-
bilism, we should go one step further and move all the way to distributed
reliabilism.
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Goldberg’s argument for extended reliabilism, on which I rely here, has
of course been subject to criticism. While I do not have space here to engage
with this criticism in any detail, my argument here is essentially for the con-
ditional claim that if we should move to extended reliabilism, then we should
move to distributed reliabilism. Depending on how the debate unfolds, it
may turn out that the initial move to extended reliabilism is insufficiently
motivated, or cannot be motivated by the arguments provided by Goldberg.
But I note here that I am more optimistic than some of the critics. For ex-
ample, Gerken suggest that the notion of a quasi-belief dependent process
may overliberalize the notion of belief-dependence, with the result that even
perceptual beliefs may end up qualifying as (quasi-)belief dependent, since
they depend on outputs of reliability-assessable perceptual processes (Gerken
2012) (cf. Malmgren 2011). However, in light of the cognitive penetrability
of perception (Deroy 2013; Stokes 2013), we may already have reason to
view the formation of perceptual beliefs as being (strictly) belief depen-
dent, so I do not take the worry about overliberalization to be particularly
pressing.
I emphasize that, by urging a move to distributed reliabilism, I do not
mean to suggest that the internal structure of extended belief-forming pro-
cesses should be disregarded. As Gerken’s hypothesis of outsourced cog-
nition (Gerken 2014), for example, emphasizes, the offloading of cognitive
processing to external resources is itself a cognitive process, and the in-
terface between internal and external resources will often be explanatorily
important. I acknowledge this point, but I do not take it to count against
distributed reliabilism, for, just as nothing prevents us from taking account
of the complex structure of belief forming processes that are entirely inter-
nal, nothing prevents us from taking account of structure in the case of
extended processes. For example, as noted above, epistemologists sometimes
describe remembering as a simple belief-dependent process, taking a belief
as input, storing it, then producing the same belief as output. In reality,
even if we bracket social influences on memory (Sutton et al. 2010; Stone
et al. 2012; Michaelian 2013a), remembering is an extraordinarily complex
process, pulling in, integrating, and transforming information from a vari-
ety of sources at every stage from initial encoding, through consolidation
of a stable representation, to the reconstructive retrieval process that gen-
erates the content of the potential memory belief and the metacognitive
monitoring processes that determine whether or not the generated repre-
sentation ends up being believed (and, if so, with what level of confidence)
(Michaelian 2011, 2012b). The fact that we refer, for purposes of epistemic
assessment, to a single overall memory process does not prevent us from
taking this complexity into account. Analogously, the fact that we refer
to a single overall belief producing process in many cases of testimony- or
instrument-based belief in no way prevents us from taking account of the role
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of the agent’s cognition in offloading processing onto the relevant external
resource.
3.3. Potential problems for distributed reliabilism
While distributed reliabilism fits better with distributed cognition than
do the alternative views considered here, it is not without problems.
3.3.1. The costs of retreating from virtue epistemology
Retreating from virtue epistemology to a form of process reliabilism has
costs. In particular, we must give up on the idea—what Pritchard (2005)
refers to as the ability intuition—that knowledge presupposes more than
mere reliability, that reliability must result from a cognitive achievement on
the part of the agent.
Consider the case of “Temp”. Temp forms his beliefs about the temper-
ature in the room by consulting a thermometer. The thermometer appears to
be normal, but it is actually malfunctioning, and randomly indicates different
temperatures. However, there is a hidden agent who controls the temperature
in the room, adjusting it so that it matches the temperature indicated by
the thermometer at any given time. Temp’s temperature beliefs are reliably
formed, but intuitively he does not know the temperature in the room, and
one natural way of explaining why Temp lacks knowledge is to point to the
fact that the reliability of his belief-forming process has nothing to do with
his cognitive ability.
Interestingly, the implications of distributed reliabilism might diverge
from those of standard process reliabilism here. Pritchard’s description of
the case presupposes that the reliability of the thermometer itself is irrelevant
to the epistemic status of Temp’s beliefs. But if we allow the belief-forming
process to include the thermometer’s functioning, the process as a whole will
be unreliable, yielding the intuitively correct verdict that there is something
epistemically defective about Temp’s beliefs about the temperature in the
room. However, distributed reliabilism cannot account for our intuitions in
all cases. Consider the case of “Alvin” (originally due to Plantinga (1993),
adapted by Pritchard (2010)), who has a brain lesion that randomly but
reliably causes him to form true beliefs about arithmetical sums. Assuming
that Alvin has no understanding of the nature of the lesion, the relevant
beliefs intuitively fail to qualify as knowledge, yet reliabilism will count him
as having knowledge. There are reliabilist responses to such cases available
(e.g., Becker 2013), but I do not pretend to be able to show here that one of
these responses works. I simply note that distributed reliabilism is no worse
off than is standard process reliabilism, and that the debate over whether
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cases such as the brain lesion case actually require us to move to virtue
epistemology is ongoing. While the ability intuition is powerful, it is not
decisive, and hence the benefits of distributed reliabilism may still outweigh
its costs.
3.3.2. Vagueness and reliabilist knowledge
My argument for moving from virtue epistemology to distributed relia-
bilism depends on the problem of vagueness encountered by virtue theories
when weak d-cog is taken into account. Discussing this problem, Green
grants that, while “[t]here must be some minimal threshold of ability that an
agent contributes in order to know on a credit view”, “establishing where
that minimal threshold should be placed is not easy” (Green 2014). However,
he points out that many epistemologies face similar problems—for example,
it is well-known that reliabilists cannot identify a precise threshold of reli-
ability that a process must meet in order for a true belief that it produces
to count as knowledge. This point is directly relevant to my strategy here:
if Green is right, reliabilism (including distributed reliabilism) is afflicted by
the same sort of vagueness (though for a different reason) that leads me to
reject virtue epistemology.
I grant, of course, that reliabilism cannot specify a non-vague threshold
of reliability that a process must cross in order to generate knowledge. One
obvious move to make at this point, as Green points out, is to go contextual-
ist, letting context determine the degree of reliability required for knowledge.
Given that I reject making the analogous move to save COGAWEAK (section,
3.1.1), obviously I reject making this move to save reliabilism. What I want
to suggest, instead, is that, rather than giving us a reason for rejecting reli-
abilism, the impossibility of specifying a non-vague threshold of reliability
gives us a reason for abandoning the attempt to theorize knowledge, as op-
posed to other epistemically relevant properties, such as level of justification.
This suggestion is of course highly unorthodox, and I can do no more than
sketch it here. Given the history of failure of attempts to theorize knowledge,
however, it should at least be granted that the suggestion is non-crazy.
Given a commitment to a form of naturalism that views epistemology
as being in the business of theorizing natural phenomena, with objective
boundaries, what should reliabilists say in response to the apparent impossi-
bility of specifying a principled boundary between reliability insufficient for
knowledge and reliability sufficient for knowledge? One possibility is to insist
that it will prove possible, in the long run, to specify such a boundary. But
this view seems to be more or less hopeless. Another possibility is to grant
that we will be unable do so, but to argue that, rather than suggesting that
there is something wrong with reliabilism, the impossibility of specifying a
principled boundary suggests that the attempt to do so is itself mistaken, for
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there is no such boundary in the world. Though we might conventionally
refer to “knowledge”, knowledge is not a state in the world distinct from
true belief. Subjects have beliefs, and those beliefs can be true or false—there
is a difference between believing and failing to believe, between believing ac-
curately and believing inaccurately. True beliefs can be more or less reliably
produced (among other epistemically relevant properties (Alston 1993)), but
it is not as if, once some threshold of reliability is crossed, they become states
of a different sort—knowledge, as opposed to mere true belief. Hence, while
we may wish, for practical purposes, to specify a desirable degree of reliability
in a given context, such specifications should not be taken to be attempts to
mark a real difference between different kinds of true belief (knowledgeable
vs. non-knowledgeable). It remains possible to evaluate true beliefs as being
epistemically better or worse, since they may be more or less reliably pro-
duced, more or less sensitive, etc. But the differences here will be differences
of degree, not differences of kind.
Note that such a “nihilist” strategy is unavailable to the virtue episte-
mologist, since the point of moving to virtue epistemology in the first place
is to provide a theory of knowledge that can cope with certain hard cases. By
the same token, adopting the nihilist strategy has the added benefit that it
eliminates most of the costs involved in retreating from virtue epistemology
to reliabilism, since the (supposed) advantages of virtue epistemology over
reliabilism mostly have to do with the difficulty that reliabilism has in dis-
criminating knowledgeable true beliefs from non-knowledgeable true beliefs
in these cases.
Summing up: Pritchard has argued that a relatively weak version of
virtue epistemology is compatible with weak d-cog, but whether this is so
depends on whether, in cases of distributed cognition of the sort described
by weak d-cog, the subject’s cognitive agency in general plays a significant
role in bringing about formation of true belief, and the role played by the
subject’s agency in fact is highly variable, with the contribution of agency
being quite minimal in some cases. Even a minimal contribution may be
enough to count as significant, but the notion of significance at work here
is vague. Hence it may be preferable to move from virtue epistemology to
reliabilism, thus avoiding any reference to the significance of the role of
agency, and Goldberg’s arguments for extended reliabilism can be developed
further to ground a form of distributed reliabilism which fits particularly well
with d-cog. It may be, in the end, that there is no epistemically significant
difference between what happens when we ask someone for directions and
what happens when we JFGI. While distributed reliabilism will not be to
everyone’s taste—in particular, those who are wedded to the ability intuition
will reject it, as will those who insist that the task of epistemology is to provide
us with a theory of knowledge rather than a theory of justification—I take
the theory to be sufficiently well-motivated to merit further investigation.
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Notes
1. Of course, websites are typically (though not always) written by human authors;
googling may thus look like a indirect way of accessing testimony, in which case
the phrase does not suggest the sort of view that I have in mind. But search
engines are not neutral conduits for information, and so we may take the phrase
to suggest more than the idea that indirect human testimony is epistemically on
a par with direct human testimony. When you google something, you rely on the
search engine to select relevant websites, filter out unreliable results, and so on.
Indeed, in some cases, the search engine itself may attempt to answer your query
(as when one searches on a phrase such as “temperature in Ankara”, “local time
in Sofia”, etc.). At any rate, the same point could be made using the phrase
“just fucking Wolfram Alpha it” (though Google confirms that no one has ever
actually used this phrase), in reference to the “computational knowledge engine”
(http://www.wolframalpha.com/) that attempts to directly compute answers to
questions on the basis of information available online, rather than simply pro-
viding the user with links to pages containing relevant information.
2. Or at least standard virtue epistemology. It might be possible to retain the broad
virtue approach by moving to a distributed credit view; I return to this possibility
below.
3. Vaesen (2011) similarly argues that d-cog is incompatible with strong virtue
theories, using the case of a baggage inspector:
Sissi has been a baggage inspector all her life. She used to work with an old-fashioned
SYSTEM1, but since 9/11, the airport she is working for introduced a SYSTEM2.
Her supervisor Joseph, a cognitive engineer who was actually involved in the design
of the device, has informed her how it works (how its operation is almost identical
to the operation of the old system). Currently Sissi is inspecting a piece of luggage
which contains a bomb. She notices and forms a true belief regarding the contents
of the suitcase. As such, the bomb is intercepted and a catastrophe prevented from
happening.
As Vaesen sets up the case, the relevant counterfactual situation is one in which
Sissi uses SYSTEM1 and therefore forms a false belief. So the most salient factor
explaining her formation of a true belief is the external resource, SYSTEM2—her
cognitive success is not primarily creditable to her agency. As far as I can tell,
any differences between Lackey’s testimony case and Vaesen’s baggage inspector
case do not affect my argument here.
4. This strategy requires saying something about the conditions under which a
process counts as integrated in the right way into an agent’s cognitive character.
Pritchard mentions several ways: the agent knows that and why the process is
reliable; the process is (roughly) innate; the agent has been successfully relying
on the process for a sufficiently long span of time. Of these criteria for cognitive
integration, the first is extremely strong and is unlikely to be satisfied by many
processes, the second will not be satisfied by many of the processes at issue in
cases of cognitive extension, and the third will not be satisfied by newly acquired
processes. Thus at this point we lack a unified account of cognitive integration;
but an intuitive understanding should be enough for present purposes.
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5. The language of “assembly” is used by Clark, e.g., in his Principle of Ecological
Assembly (“the canny cognizer tends to recruit, on the spot, whatever mix of
problem-solving resources will yield an acceptable result with a minimum of
effort” (Clark 2008, 13)). As Hutchins notes, Clark emphasizes assemblies in the
sense of assembled resources, rather than assembly as the process of assembling
resources (Hutchins 2011). My focus here is on assembly as a process.
6. Consider the case of the well-known patient H.M., who developed exceptionally
thorough retrograde and anterograde amnesia after surgery on his medial tem-
poral lobe (intended to cure his epilepsy); even H.M., who did rely on external
memory stores to compensate for his severely impaired memory, retained some
ability to acquire new procedural memories as well as some (limited) use of his
biological semantic memory (Corkin 2013).
7. As noted in section 1.2, we lack a satisfactory criterion of the cognitive integra-
tion of extended processes. This is particularly evident when considering cases
where the agent puts together a novel assemblage of resources. Such processes
will likely fail to satisfy the three criteria suggested by Pritchard (known relia-
bility, innateness, and long-term use), yet, intuitively, they count as cognitively
integrated, given the active role of the subject in creating the assemblage.
8. Kelp also considers adopting an alternative form of robust virtue epistemology,
due to Sosa (2007), according to which what matters is whether the subject’s
cognitive success “manifests” ability on his part. I will not consider this alter-
native form of robust virtue epistemology here, though I suspect that a similar
problem arises for it (how much of a contribution need the subject make before
his success “manifests” ability?).
9. An additional advantage of CREDIT FOR US AND THE MACHINES is that
it is more likely to be compatible with strong d-cog than are more traditional
virtue approaches. Strong d-cog views the subject’s internal cognitive resources as
components of an extended cognitive system in a strict sense, on a par with the
relevant external components (i.e., with the components of the extended system
that are external from the subject’s point of view), and hence would seem to
acknowledge no principled reason for singling out the subject’s agency when
assigning credit for cognitive success.
10. I set aside the fact that this characterization of remembering as a matter of
storing and retrieving beliefs, though common in epistemology, is fundamentally
mistaken (Michaelian 2012a); it is sufficient for Goldberg’s argument that, if
memory were to function this way, then it would provide a special case of the
general principle.
11. This way of describing the view may suggest that it assumes the truth of a
strong form of the hypothesis of extended cognition; as a strictly epistemological
view, however, it is meant to be neutral between stronger and weaker versions of
distributed/extended cognition.
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